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SUMMARY Refinery processes need to organise and maintain work places safe for their workers, 
neighbours and the environment. Refineries are the source of many accidents and incidents due to 
the close proximity of dangerous substances, products and production processes. The aim of this 
study was to analyse the consequences of hydrogen sulphide leakage scenarios in gas refineries and 
determine the danger boundary and the risk limits of these scenarios. The study was descriptive-
analytic cross-sectional and was carried out in gas refineries. To assess the gas dispersion modality 
and the effects of leakage scenarios the PHAST software (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tool) 
was used. Different leakage scenarios were considered and then various climatic conditions affec-
ting these scenarios were identified. Ultimately, the consequences and the danger boundary and 
risk limits of these scenarios for the affected areas were determined with two-level criteria, LC (lethal 
concentration) and IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health). The findings demonstrated that 
the hazard distance LC50 for hydrogen sulphide dispersion to restricted areas and the hazard distan-
ce of the IDLH for hydrogen sulphide toxic dispersion to impacted area were 224 meters and 386 
m, respectively. Also, the results revealed that the ENI camp was situated in the dominant current 
direction, at a 200 m distance from gas refineries. In the event of a leakage accident, substantial loss 
of life and health damages can be expected. Consequently, it is mandatory that the location of the 
residents’ camp be changed and appropriate engineering control measures taken.
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INTRODUCTION
There have always been potential hazards in 
the petroleum and gas industries that can cau-
se severe and irreparable injuries and financial 
losses (Revie, 2015). The processing accidents 
are the largest and most frequent causes of erro-
neous costs in industries, refineries, and Mega 
projects in Iran. Determination of the damage 
limit, impact rate and the scenario occurrence 
of these accidents have special importance in 
recognition and control of the risk in these sce-
narios (USA Department of Defence, 1980). To 
take security measures in the surrounding area 
of the gas refineries, there must be a design for 
checking the damage sources, e.g., the proce-
ssing pipelines, the spherical tanks, the distillati-
on columns, etc. Then, the outcomes of different 
scenarios involved in the creation of the crisis 
should be analyzed. Determining the limits of 
the restricted and impacted areas due to occu-
rrence of these scenarios must also be determi-
ned. Finally, controlling and defensive measures 
need to be taken in the impacted areas for the 
installations, e.g., changing location, fencing, 
and automation (Witkowski et al., 2015). The 
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first step in studying and assessing consequen-
ces of possible accidents such as the dispersion 
or release of noxious and lethal materials in a 
processing unit is modeling of the release (Ger-
boni & Salvador, 2011). Then, the model of the 
next consequences that can occur such as fire 
and/or material explosion and the damage due to 
the toxic material dispersion should be conduc-
ted (Gerboni & Salvador, 2011, Witkowski et al., 
2015). Most of the processing accidents include 
huge damages due to the nature and the extent of 
the use of chemical materials (Centre for Chemi-
cal Process Safety, 2000). It is worth noting that 
regarding the abundance of active manpower in 
our country, industrial projects and employment 
of nearly 5000 personnel in the construction 
and commissioning of every refinery will susta-
in processing occurrence of damages and human 
injuries. That is why the processing accidents are 
considered as serious scenario concerns for the 
commissions and international community (Jafari 
et al., 2012). Many countries have taken preventi-
ve and controlling measures against the incidence 
of processing accidents according to the princi-
ples and research experiences (Centre for Chemi-
cal Process Safety, 1994). To increase the number 
of refinery units and their output products, we will 
naturally increase the number of employed staff 
in these industries and the resident population 
near them who are exposed to the hazards. As an 
example, the Felix Borough factory accident cau-
sed 28 people to be killed and 26 to be injured in 
England in 1974 (Advisory Committee on Major 
Hazards, 1984). Another similar occurrence was 
a chemical accident in Bhopal, India, in 1984 (Lu 
et al., 2015). The accident resulted in 2500 in-
toxication cases and 10 times more injuries. Also 
11 people were killed in Mexico Golf by leakage 
and fire of petroleum from gas rigs of BP (British 
Petroleum) and the imposed damages were more 
than $40 billion. Besides, the disaster caused 22 
% drop in the stock value and 63 % decrease in 
profit (McCrea-Strub et al., 2012). The PHAST 
software (Process Hazard Analysis Software To-
ols) is a comprehensive line analysis tool for line 
analysis of the danger and determination of the 
secure privacy in the developed countries. This 
software with easy application and flexibility and 
high accuracy, allows the user to analyze different 
amounts for vast limits of the model parameters 
(Dziubiński et al., 2006). The study by Nadimi 
entitled: “Dispersion modeling of CO2 Escaping 
from Steel Industries” used PHAST to determine 
the rate of pollution (Nadimi et al., 2011). Also, in 
the study by Jianwen et al. entitled: “Assessment 
of Quantitative Risk of Dangers of Gas Transmissi-
on and Distribution” PHAST was used to analyze 
the accidents (Jianwen & Wenxing, 2014). Besi-
des, Chiara Vianella used PHAST to determine the 
safe privacy in their study entitled: “Designing a 
Conceptual Model of Risk Assessment of Hazar-
ds due to CO2 Dispersion” (Vianello et al., 2012). 
The South Pars Gas Field is one of the greatest gas 
sources in the world located on the common bor-
der between Iran and Qatar. It is one of the main 
sources of the energy of the country. This field has 
an area of 9700 km2 with 3700 km2 belonging to 
Iran. The gas reservoir of this section is speculated 
to be 14 trillion m3 of gas along with 18 billion 
m3 liquid gas. This comprises 7.5% of the world 
gas reservoir and about 50% of the country’s gas. 
The refinery installations of South Pars Phases 
2 & 3 were delivered to Total Consortium, Gas 
prom, and PETRONAS under a buyback contract 
for daily extraction of 2000 million cubic feet of 
gas, 80000 barrels of liquid gas, and 400 tons of 
sulfides in September, 1998. The submarine insta-
llations include two three-welled rigs for digging 
twenty development wells, two 32-inch submarine 
pipelines, and two 4.5-inch off-shore pipelines for 
the transmission of the mixture of Mono Ethylene 
Glycol and Amine from the shore to the rigs, each 
with 105 km length. The gas refinery installations 
of these two phases including four operational 
rows in the shore with 50 million m3 have been 
already installed. These include gas and liquid 
gas receiving and separation units, liquid gas sta-
bilization and also sweetening dehydration and 
dew point setting, demercaptannization and gas 
contraction for transmission recovery and sulfur 
solidification, torch and its auxiliary equipment, 
and receiving of mono-Ethylene Glycol for tran-
smission with 4.5-inch pipeline and injection to 
the transmission 32-inch pipelines. The purpose 
of this study was to determine the danger zones 
for impacted and affected (restricted) areas, regar-
ding the hydration sulfide gas leakage scenario. 
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METHODS 
This was a descriptive-analytic cross-sectio-
nal study conducted in one of Gas Refinery in 
south Iran. There are various methods for con-
sequence assessment all of which have similar 
structure and output. However, there are diffe-
rences in their details and process division. Con-
sequence modeling includes modeling materials 
release in the environment and subsequently, 
modeling the consequences due to toxicity, in-
flammation or explosion of these substances. As 
these models are complex and time-consuming, 
so, they are solved by the use of computers. To 
do so, the PHAST 6.54 software (Process Hazard 
Analysis Software Tool) was selected as it is the 
best and one of the most accurate instruments 
offered for environmental risk modeling (Dziu-
biński et al., 2006). It has been known as one of 
the tools of decision-making used by people, sta-
tes, and firms in industrial hazards and common 
immunity (Schubach, 1995). The present study 
investigated the modeling of the most important 
foci of hazards in South Pars Gas Refinery Phases 
2 & 3. In so doing, the clot stuck unit of South 
Pars Refinery Phases 2 and 3 were surveyed for 
fire load and different scenarios were considered 
for each unit. The consequence of each scena-
rio was determined to speculate the restricted 
(affected) and impacted areas. As it is true with 
other modelling practices, to operationalize this 
process, there will be the need for actual data 
along with the application of some hypotheses 
and assumptions. The characteristics and infor-
mation related to the dispersion site of H2S form 
the clot stuck unit and also data related to the 
required climatic conditions were recorded for 
modelling (Table 1 & Table 2). The culled data 
were then given to PHAST.
Table1.  Specifications of the H2S pipeline with the 
leak in the modelling
Tablica 1.  Specifikacije H2S plinovoda s modelom 
istjecanja
Table 2.  The climate conditions in the modeling 
Tablica 2.  Vremenski uvjeti u modelu
RESULTS
This study applied the exposure index of H2S 
toxicity with two-level criteria LC (Lethal con-
centration) and IDLH (Immediately dangerous to 
life or health) to determine the secure privacy. 
The safe distance of the restricted and impacted 
areas as well as the climatic indices and parame-
ters related to leaking H2S transmission pipelines 
were identified using PHAST. Table 3 and Table 
4 display the effect criteria of intoxication with 
H2S (Das & Weinberg., 2012, Rusin & Stolecka, 
2011).
Release location size/type
Line diameter (inch) 32
Release dia. (mm) 140
Release length (mm) 600
Pressure (bar) 60
The height from ground level (M) 3
Pipe material Carbon Steel
Pipe roughness (mm) 0.0178
Climate Parameters Rate
Temperature (°C) 10
Relative humidity (%) 64
Wind direction west
Dew point (°C) 0
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Table 3.  The Toxicity criteria of H2S for determina-
tion of the restricted areas 
Tablica 3.  Kriteriji toksičnosti H2S za utvrđivanje 
zona zabrane  
Table 4.  Table 4. Toxicity criteria of H2S for deter-
mination of the restricted areas 
Tablica 4.  Kriteriji toksičnosti H2S za utvrđivanje 
zona zabrane  
The findings of this study further indicated 
the important point that the hazards distance re-
garding LC for H2S Toxic Dispersion was 224 m 
(Table 5) for the restricted area and it was 386 m 
(Table 6) regarding IDLH for H2S Toxic Dispersi-
on for the impacted area.
Now, considering the 200 meters distance of 
the ENI camp from danger area in which 600 pe-
ople including the NIOPDC personnel reside, it 
is rendered as mandatory to evacuate this camp 
due to its proximity with (adjacency to) refinery 
pollutants. 
DISCUSSION 
Much research has been done and many me-
asures have been taken over the last decades 
to prevent the incidence of potential disastrous 
accidents and promote the safety level in che-
mical processes. The result has been systematic 
management of safety in these processes. One of 
LC for H2S Toxic Dispersion





IDLH for H2S Toxic Dispersion











The modeled hazard Distance (m)
H2S Concentration in the fence 
location (340 m)
The width of vapor 
Cloud
Velocity of Wind (m/s) Velocity of wind (m/s) Velocity of wind (m/s)
2 5 16 2 5 16 2 5
1000 60 72 74 81 330 330 270 - -
800 300 102 107 122 300 330 240 - -
700 600 122 133 150 340 360 240 - -
500 1800 191 224 214 330 360 240 - -
Dispersion Rate (kg/s) 283.31







The modeled hazard Distance (m)
H2S Concentration in the fence 
location (340 m)
The width of vapor 
Cloud
Velocity of Wind (m/s) Velocity of wind (m/s) Velocity of wind (m/s)
2 5 16 2 5 16 2 5
500 60 191 221 214 302 360 240 - -
400 300 255 297 259 302 360 240 - -
360 600 290 329 280 340 332 240 30 28
300 1800 355 386 308 340 362 240 38 40
Dispersion Rate (kg/s) 283.31
Table 5.  Table 5. Hazard radius relating to the restricted area
Tablica 5.  Radijus opasnosti za zonu zabrane 
Table 6.  Hazard radius relating to the impacted area
Tablica 6.  Radijus opasnosti za zahvaćenu zonu
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the basic elements of safety management systems 
is the identification of dangers, risk assessment, 
and the scenarios of probable accidents and their 
consequences. This would aid the safety experts to 
perform the required investigations and use them 
in logical decision making to reduce the likelihood 
of the occurrence of accidents and their consequ-
ences (Rusin & Stolecka, 2015). The exact spe-
culation and determination of accidents and the 
consequences of activities of chemical industries 
is the crux of a stubborn problem and the direct 
and indirect erroneous costs of these industries is 
extremely vast. Thus, regarding these issues, the 
efforts of the chemical industries to prevent dama-
ge and loss seems to be natural. Paying attention 
to the safety of installations and constructions and 
the related hazards and their effects on humanity 
and daily routine lives of the societies affected by 
them should be highlighted. In the past, it was so-
lely after the incidence of accidents that their cau-
ses were investigated and the damages and great 
losses were calculated. On the contrary, to day, 
the problematic points and critical areas could be 
determined beforehand due to the availability of 
various risk assessment methods and analysis of 
consequences of scenarios of accidents. Measures 
can be taken to identify the type of accidents and 
control them (Rusin & Stolecka, 2015). Prolifera-
tive research has been conducted so far on con-
sequence modeling and analysis of consequences 
of leakage, fire, explosion, and the effect (impact) 
boundary around the danger source. The study 
by Spyros Sklavounos (2003) entitled: “Determi-
nation of Safe Distance in Proximity of Gas Fuel 
Pipelines” demonstrated that regarding the envi-
ronmental and structural conditions, the safety ray 
was 850 meters (Sklavounos & Rigas, 2006). Also, 
in the study by Matthijsen entitled: “The Safe Dis-
tance of Hydrogen Charging Stations” the safe 
process distance was estimated to be 410 meters 
(Matthijsen & Kooi, 2006). The study by Rigas et 
al. entitled: “Determination of Safe Distance for 
Accessing Explosive Materials Pipelines” revea-
led that a distance of at least 1240 meters should 
be considered for any type of building operations 
(Rigas & Sebos, 1998). Moreover, the study by 
Moonis (2010) conducted on assessing the risk of 
Hydrogen gas production chain showed that the 
sudden fire ray due to leakage from hydrogen tan-
ker was 400 meters (Moonis et al., 2010). Further-
more, another research carried out by Gorboni 
and Salvador (2009) demonstrated that the sud-
den fire ray and eruptive fire due to leakage from 
Hydrogen gas transmission pipeline were 13 and 
30 meters, respectively. In this study, the secure 
privacy of Hydrogen production process was de-
termined on the basis of risk estimation indicating 
that the safe distance of Hydrogen production unit 
is 165 m (Gerboni & Salvador, 2011). The present 
study used PHAST software to model the poisons 
release model and formation of vapor cloud due 
to leakage, and the hazard distance form the clot 
stuck unit and slug-catcher was considered. Also, 
the findings of this study indicated that the hazard 
distance was 224 m and 386 m for the restricted 
and impacted areas, respectively. It should be no-
ted that the official-residential camp of ENI with 
its 600 residents of NIOPDC personnel is 200 me-
ters distant from the danger area. This camp was 
established in 2001 to be used as the residential 
place of personnel of the Italian ENI Company. 
It should be emphasized that after inauguration 
of phases 2 & 3, this camp was submitted to the 
Iranian side and it had to be evacuated due to its 
close proximity to the refinery and its pollutants, 
yet, due to some financial problems this was not 
done and it is still being used for the residence of 
the personnel. Consequently, it is notable that this 
camp is located in the risk zone. Hence, it should 
be immediately transferred to a new site to reduce 
the potential human casualties in the case of the 
incidence of any leakage from the discharge unit.
CONCLUSION
A quick glance at the role of consequence 
evaluation clearly betrays how far the nature of 
consequence assessment can cover the defici-
encies of traditional methods which are mostly 
based on previous experiences and engineering 
judgments. The study of consequence assessment 
can be a useful innovation for determining their 
newer applications.
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PROCJENA SIGURNIH UDALJENOSTI KOD 
ISTJECANJA I EMISIJA VODIKOVOG SULFIDA IZ 
PLINSKIH RAFINERIJA 
SAŽETAK: Rafinerijski procesi moraju biti organizirani i održavani tako da jamče sigurnost rad-
nika, susjeda i okoliša. Rafinerije su izvor mnogih nesreća i incidenata budući da su opasne 
tvari, proizvodi i proizvodni procesi smješteni vrlo blizu. Cilj studije je proučiti posljedice raznih 
scenarija istjecanja vodikova sulfida u plinskim rafinerijama i utvrditi granice zone opasnosti i 
rizike svakog scenarija. Priroda studije bila je opisno-analitična, a istraživanje je provedeno u 
plinskim rafinerijama. Za utvrđivanje načina širenja plina i utjecaja njegova istjecanja primije-
njen je PHAST software. Razrađeno je više scenarija, a također su utvrđivani i utjecaji različitih 
vremenskih uvjeta na te scenarije i to na dvije razine, LC (lethal concentration = smrtonosna 
koncentracija) i IDLH (immediately dangerous to life or health = neposredna opasnost za život 
ili zdravlje). Rezultati ukazuju da je zona smrtne opasnosti LC50 pri širenju vodikova sulfida i 
zona opasnosti širenja otrova 224 odnosno 386 m. Također je utvrđeno da je ENI-jevo boravište 
za radnike smješteno u zoni utjecaja dominantne struje i to na udaljenosti od samo 200 m od 
rafinerije. U slučaju istjecanja mogu se očekivati znatni gubici života i štete za zdravlje. Stoga je 
nužno preseliti boravište radnika na drugu lokaciju i poduzeti mjere tehničke kontrole.           
Ključne riječi: nesreće u proizvodnji, plinske rafinerije, istjecanje vodikova sulfida,                         
zona zabrane, zahvaćena zona
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